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Abstract
The vocational training system is an important factor within the German institutional
framework. Its high output of skilled and well-educated employees provides a basis
for Germany’s  export success and innovation.  In the last few years, however,
growing concern has been expressed about the viability of the German model.
Globalization, the appearance of new forms of work organization and a rapid growth
in net training costs are increasingly seen as a challenge. These factors together with
the impacts of the transfer of the apprenticeship training to East Germany are
discussed, the attractiveness of the system to school-leavers as well as for
employers is analyzed and proposals for reform are developed.
Zusammenfassung
Das duale System führt zu einer umfassenden beruflichen Ausbildung für die
Mehrheit der Schulabgänger und stellt daher einen bedeutenden Faktor der
institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen für die deutsche Wirtschaft dar. Die intensive
Ausbildung der Beschäftigten bildet eine Basis für die Herstellung hochwertiger
Güter, die zu Exporterfolgen der Wirtschaft führen und die Innovationserfolge der
Unternehmen stützen. In den letzten Jahren werden jedoch Bedenken laut, ob das
"deutsche Modell" überlebensfähig ist.  Die Globalisierung der Unternehmen, neue
Formen der Arbeitsorganisation, der Anstieg der Nettoausbildungskosten und die
Rezession lassen Zweifel an der Attraktivität des dualen Systems für die
Unternehmen, aber auch für die Schulabgänger auftreten. In dieser Studie werden
Gründe für den Ausbildungsrückgang untersucht, die Ausbildungssituation in
Ostdeutschland betrachtet und Vorschläge für eine Reform der Berufsausbildung
entwickelt.
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11. The Importance of the Vocational Training System
for the German Model
The German system has long combined a high level of competitiveness in
world markets with a strong social cohesion that fosters low levels of inequality
in a high wage economy.  This framework depends on a set of socio-economic
institutions - including banks, employer associations, and trade unions - that
support long-term commitments by labor and capital.  One important factor
within this institutional framework is the vocational training system, which is
seen by many authors to play a key role in Germany's comparative advantage
in the production of high quality, internationally competitive manufactured goods
through 'diversified quality production' (DQP), which is based on highly skilled
craft workers and engineers (Sorge and Streeck 1988, Streeck 1995, Soskice
1997 ).   Its high output of skilled and well-educated employees is also seen to
provide the basis for Germany’s  export success and innovation (Carlin, Glyn,
and van Reenan 1996; Kern 1996; Wagner, O`Mahony, and Paulsson 1997).
In the last few years, however, growing concern has been expressed about
the viability of the German model.   Globalization and the appearance of new
forms of work organization are increasingly seen as a challenge (Streeck 1995).
In the late 1980s new models of production were developed, and the training
system began to be adapted (Kern and Schumann 1984).   The new training
structures have been updated and broadened so that the curricula contain
improved technical content and require training in social competencies.  Even
with these changes, the German skill creation system in the 1990s has to adapt
to new challenges, such as lean production, with its emphasis on team work,
continuous improvement processes, flexible machine tools, close supplier
relationships, and rapid innovation.   Case studies show that the skills provided
by the dual system along with the subsequent Meister training continue to be
relevant in the new organizational context  (see Finegold and Wagner in this
volume).  However, the restructuring of the curricula have placed a greater
burden on the shoulders of the employers by increasing their net training costs.
A strong increase in the apprenticeship allowance at the beginning of the 1990s
has further  added to the cost of training .  If employers investing in the
vocational training system -  as in other business processes -  are to obtain an
adequate return on their investment, then measures to reduce  their net training
costs are needed.  The balance between the costs and benefits of training will
be the first major point discussed in this chapter.
While the German training system might be coping with new forms of work
organization, two further problems have affected the sustainability of the
system:  unification and a severe recession.  The recession, which began in
1991, induced an unprecedented loss of jobs in manufacturing industry, and
export performance has deteriorated sharply.   Although the German economy
is slowly recovering from the economic slump, many companies are still
2trimming their work forces and outsourcing more abroad, particularly in Eastern
Europe.   With the reduction in their overall employment, employers do not see
a need for hiring new workers and thus refrain from offering apprenticeship
places.   This leads to a strong reduction in the supply of apprenticeship places,
which is the backbone of the German training system.  If supply does not cover
the demand for training places, young people will not be trained, and the high
skill strategy of the German system might fail.  The balance between the supply
and demand for training places will be the second major issue dealt with in this
chapter.
The third topic is the transfer of the West German training system to East
Germany.1   At the time of unification, West Germany was one of the world’s
most successful and high wage economies (Streeck 1995).  After unification
almost all West German institutions - and with them the high-skill, high-wage
model - were transferred to East Germany.   Trade unions and employer
associations agreed to raise East German wages to West German levels within
five years to protect the existing high-skill high-wage system of the West.
Accordingly, wages soared in East Germany, while productivity lagged behind
(Hitchens, Wagner, and Birnie 1993).  The skills of East German workers were
lower than those of West German workers, and technology was also in need of
modernization.   As a result, East Germany was not prepared to compete in
highly-skilled, high quality markets  (Wagner 1993, Wagner et al. 1995).   Even
with subsidies and training initiatives, the updating of skills and the efficient use
of modern machinery will inevitably take a long time.   In addition, the traditional
market of the East German economy was the Eastern bloc, which did not
require and could not afford to pay higher prices for better products.  Hence
these markets broke away, and the Eastern manufacturers had to get into new
markets which were already occupied by their West German counterparts or by
other advanced producers.  The consequence was a widespread collapse of
East German manufacturing.   Although each year more than 100 billion DM
are transferred to subsidize the East German economy, a basis for self-
sustaining growth has so far not been established (Carlin and Soskice 1997).
The effects of the dismal economic situation on the supply of apprenticeships
will be the third major topic of the chapter.
All these issues show the need for reform.   Since the apprenticeship
system is the major provider of vocational skills, the German model of high
quality production is highly dependent on it.   It provides the comprehensive
theoretical and practical training through the "dual system" for about 70% of
German young people.   Because of its central role, the growing debate - about
whether the apprenticeship system is in need of reform - is quite controversial
(Althoff 1994, Dybowki et al.  1994, Degen and Walden 1997).  On the one
hand, some fear that the demand for places will drop and criticize the fact that
the dual system is not attractive enough for good school-leavers, losing too
many of them to higher education.  A large number of small companies (with up
to 99 employees) are unable to fill their offered training places (Lenske 1997).
                                                          
1 East Germany here stands for the new federal states of the former German Democratic
Republic (GDR); West Germany stands for the old federal states of the Federal Republic
prior to unification.
3On the other hand, it is argued (particularly in East Germany) that there is a
surplus of would-be apprentices, and that the dual system will be decreasingly
able to accommodate all applicants (Althoff 1994, Rüttgers 1996, Himmelreich
1996, Franz and Zimmermann 1996).  Trade unions and the socialist party
therefore demand that the system - which has worked up to now on the basis of
completely voluntary participation by employers - should be financed through a
levy scheme in the future.   This proposal was put forward in the 1980s to
accommodate the large increase in the number of young people seeking
apprenticeship places, but has always been strongly opposed by employers,
who claim that it will increase costs and lead to ineffective training.  This
chapter will seek to help to resolve the above controversial arguments,
concluding with a set of measures to modernize the system.
2.   Searching for the Break-Even Point in Apprenticeship
Training
2.1.  Gross costs
Since G. Becker's seminal work on human capital (1964), the incentives for
investing in firm-specific and general skills have acquired special interest.
Employers in the dual system provide both types of skills and detailed surveys
into the costs and benefits of the apprenticeship system have been conducted
(Edding 1963, Noll et al. 1983, Falk 1982, von Bardeleben et al. 1991 and
1995).   These studies show that German employers incur high gross training
costs, which differ according to the size of firms, the type of apprenticeship, and
the training year of the apprentice.  The latest survey for 1991 found average
yearly gross costs in the industry/trade occupations of 31,800 DM, and 24,900
DM in the craft sector; costs in the craft sector were thus on average about 20%
lower than in the industry/trade sector (v. Bardeleben 1995).   Gross costs are
defined as personnel costs of the trainer while he or she teaches, wage costs of
the trainee, and overhead costs.  The study also shows that training costs of
large firms, where the first two years of training is often conducted almost
entirely in training workshops, are much higher, at 42,000 DM per apprentice.
Small and medium sized enterprises, which do their training mainly on the
shop-floor, report much lower gross costs.   The difference in costs according to
the size of companies is partly reflected in Table 1, as industry/trade companies
are on average larger than craft companies.
4Table 1:   Gross training costs for different sectors and training years in DM in 1991
Industry and Trade Craft sector
total trainee wages
as % of all
costs
costs for the
trainer in %
total trainee wages
as % of all
costs
costs for
the trainer
in %
1st year 31,994 45.5 42.8 24,830 38.6 50.8
2nd year 33,102 49.3 38.2 26,254 45.9 46.3
3rd year 31,624 55.3 32.5 25,518 51.7 37.7
average 31,824 50.0 37.7 24,889 45.4 43.7
source:   von Bardeleben  et al. 1995
Costs over the different training years do not vary greatly.   While the wage
costs for the apprentices increase over time and therefore make up a larger
portion of total costs, the costs for trainers decrease at a similar level.   The
sum of wage costs for the apprentice and for the trainer account for almost 90%
of the total costs of apprenticeship training in each of the three years.
2. 2.  Net costs
Net costs are more difficult to assess, because the productive output of the
apprentice is usually not systematically measured.   In the above survey, net
costs were calculated as gross costs minus the productive output of the trainee,
which was equated to the wage costs for a skilled worker while he was
producing the same output.  These net costs were found to be about a third
higher in large than in small companies.  Net costs in the Handwerk sector, at
12,352 DM are considerably lower than in the companies that belong to the
chamber of industry and trade, at 20,509 DM, as shown in table 2.   Average
yearly net training costs are 17,862 DM.   These figures take into account a
yearly output of 11,710 DM per apprentice (von Bardeleben et al. 1995).  A
comparison over the training period illustrates an increase in the productive
output of apprentices as they advance from the first to the third training year,
when the trainees are already quite skilled and spend a higher proportion of
their time in real work settings.   Accordingly, net costs decrease, while gross
costs remain stable (see Table 2).
5Table 2:   Net costs of training in the industry/trade and craft sector according to
                training year in 1991
Industry and Trade Craft sector
gross costs productive
output
net costs gross
costs
productive output net costs
1st year 31,994   9,008 22,986 24,830   9,338 15,492
2nd year 33,102 11,036 22,066 26,254 12,020 14,234
3rd year 31,624 14,573 17,051 25,518 16,327   9,191
average 31,824 11,315 20,509 24,889 12,536 12,352
source:   Von Bardeleben  et al. 1995
2. 3.  Variable net costs
Another way to estimate the costs of training is to look only at the variable
costs.  This calculation differs from the full cost method in that fixed costs are
not considered, but only the costs which are directly associated with the
apprentice.  The costs of trainer supervisors, who instruct  apprentices as part
of their wider job responsibilities, mainly at times when they are not busy with
production themselves (in contrast to full-time trainers), and the costs of
administration, which barely increase with the intake of an apprentice, are
omitted.
Table 3:   Variable net costs of training according to company employment size in 1991
average up to 9 10-49 50-499 500+
6,339 DM 1,646 DM 3,609 DM 8,184 DM 17,886 DM
source:   von  Bardeleben et al.  1995
Using this method the average net costs to companies are reduced to just
6,339 DM per apprentice (see Table 3).   A large variation, which depends very
much on the organization of training in the firm, is again evident among
companies of different sizes.   Where training takes place predominantly on the
job, as often happens in very small companies, variable net costs amount on
average to just 1,646 DM.   Companies with more than 500 employees - which
frequently train in training workshops with full-time trainers (and full trainers'
cost) - have more than ten times that net cost:  17,886 DM.  With this method,
which seems to match real costs more accurately, the variable net costs are
6negative for almost 20% of the trainees in the industry/trade sector and for 30%
of trainees in the craft sector.   It should be emphasized that a) the training for
some companies pays off immediately over the training period (without even
considering further benefits) and b) higher benefits than net costs are not
restricted to the craft sector, as is often assumed.   The overwhelming cost item
are wages, which often account for about 80% of the total variable net costs.
Consequently,  the level of wages has a large impact on the level of training
costs.
2.4.  Further training benefits
2.4.1.  Additional flexibility
In addition to the above estimated direct output of trainees, the benefits
from employing an apprentice are often greatly underestimated.  First, benefits
are usually calculated only for those specific time periods during which
apprentices are productive.   Any corresponding slack times, such as waiting
times that would occur if a skilled worker did the job, are not taken into account.
Second, the added flexibility which an apprentice provides to the organization
just by being available when a task comes up is often not considered.   For
example, she will answer the phone or take orders from customers at the time
when they come in.   For these tasks only her time spent taking the order is
assessed as a benefit.   However, if she were not there, another person would
be needed to occupy the office full-time although this capacity would not be
fully utilized.   The same is true for occupations where some of the tasks can
only be handled by two people.
2.4.2. Savings in Recruitment Costs
Companies that hire skilled workers from the market instead of training
apprentices have to pay costs for advertisements, screening applications, doing
interviews at different levels, and travel costs.   These costs have been
estimated by a large German company to reach 2,000 DM to 3,000 DM per hire
(Cramer and Müller 1994).   If the hired person fails to fit the job, then these
costs will be incurred again in seeking a replacement worker.   While there are
also costs involved in recruiting apprentices, these are usually much lower  as
travel costs usually do not occur, there is no need for advertising since
apprentices apply  themselves or come from schools with close relations to a
given company and it is less costly to test their skills since they will learn them
on the job,, and usually one person is sufficient to conduct the interviews.
72.4.3. No adaptation costs for newly hired workers
Newly hired people, even if they are skilled, need quite some time to acquire
company-specific skills.   Interviews in mechanical engineering firms have
shown that newly hired people need between half a year and one year before
they can work with full proficiency, depending on their qualifications,
personalities, and their new jobs (Cramer and Müller 1994).  If it is assumed
that highly skilled people work during this time on average with half the
productivity of a skilled worker fully adapted to the firm, the average loss in
performance would be 27,000 DM, assuming  average yearly wage costs of
54,000 DM in 1991.   This loss is high if compared with the average net variable
costs for apprentice training of 6,339 DM per year and it is still 1.5 times the net
variable costs of apprenticeship training in establishments with more than 500
employees.  When a semi-skilled person is hired to be trained for a skilled job,
even higher costs might be incurred, since training takes a much longer time
and the output foregone is higher as well.  Companies that have tried to
introduce a team organization with a semi-skilled workforce have found that the
higher demands on the workforce require an enormous amount of new training.
To overcome these difficulties they have decided to take on more apprentices
in the future (Finegold and Wagner 1998, this volume).
During their first two years, newly skilled workers are paid the "young"
skilled worker's wage.   As about 50% of the apprentices remain with their
training company for at least two years after the apprenticeship, companies
gain additional benefits in comparison to hiring an experienced skilled worker
(Berufsbildungsbericht 1993).   In larger companies the proportion of former
apprentices remaining in the company - and therefore the benefit - is even
greater.   Many apprentices like to stay with their company for one or two years
after completion of their training, since training is not seen as being completed
with the taking of examinations.   After these years, the trainees as well as the
employers of smaller or medium sized companies regard a change in firm as an
advantage for the technical and social development of young people.  This
move is positive for the apprentices, as it adds to their know-how about
production processes, products, and work organization, which differ greatly
among establishments (Kloas 1988).  It is also positive for the companies that
hire them, since they bring new ideas and methods into the company and help
to diffuse new working practices and technology.   However, apprentices who
leave their training company directly after their exams are often regarded with
distrust.   The potential new employer might suspect that the person was not
hired by the training company because of some negative aspects in his/her
apprenticeship.
2.4.4. Avoiding the costs of poaching workers
Companies that poach skilled workers from other companies have to offer
higher wages to entice workers to leave their current companies.   If they have
to pay 10% to 15% more than the average wage, it amounts to an additional
85,000 DM to 7,500 DM per year.   Usually the higher pay for these newly hired
people cannot be kept secret, and other employees will demand a comparable
increase as well.   Over time non-training companies will therefore face
considerable additional wage costs (Soskice 1994).
2.4.5. Hiring people who fit
The risk of hiring a skilled person who does not fit the job, the team, or the
company culture is much higher than hiring an apprentice who has been
educated for over three years in the firm and whose personality and technical
skills are well-known.  Nearly three-quarters of the companies mentioned this
consideration as an important advantage in training apprentices in the 1991
survey (v.  Bardeleben et al. 1994).   With the increasing introduction of team
work and closer cooperation, the personality factor will become even more
critical.   The pressure to hire the right person, and hence the benefits from the
lengthy screening period apprenticeships provide, is particularly important in
Germany, given the relatively high cost and difficulties of firing employees.
2.4.6. Reputation of training companies
The willingness to train also affects the reputation of companies, both internally
and externally.   The large proportion of German employees who have gone
through an apprenticeship know from their own experience how important
training is for young people.   For them it is hard to understand why their
company should not give this opportunity to young school-leavers.   In addition,
employees are often looking for apprenticeships for their own children and
expect that companies might offer training places to them.   Large companies
are well aware that offering apprenticeship places can improve their external
reputation.   Their annual reports almost always include long accounts of their
training activities.   They invest a lot in the quality of training so that their
trainees score well on their exams.   This can provide them with free advertising
if their trainees are awarded a top mark by the chamber, which is reported in
the newspapers and business magazines;  many German readers associate
well-trained people with high quality goods.   The correlation between training
and reputation has recently been used in press releases of the ministry and of
the chambers to increase the willingness of companies to train by publicly
disclosing the names of those companies that do not train.
92.5. Conclusion for the break-even point in 1991
According to the above cost calculations the German apprenticeship system
has been very finely balanced; for many companies costs and benefits were
nearly equal until 1991.   Although costs vary according to sector, size of
company, and occupation, many companies, especially smaller ones which do
the bulk of training, might have come close to a break-even-point, or even have
achieved a net gain from training apprentices.   For larger companies, variable
net costs are much higher, but so too are the benefits after training.   First of all,
these companies have a choice among the better educated school-leavers,
who prefer larger companies because of their better career prospects and
greater fringe benefits.   The larger firms apply more rigorous selection criteria
in hiring school-leavers for apprenticeships.   Thereby they ensure that they get
very able apprentices who will fit the job, integrate well into the company, and
who will not drop out of training.   This helps insure that training costs are not
wasted.   Since the machinery in large manufacturers is usually more speciali-
zed, more delicate, and more expensive, a longer training period for newly hired
skilled workers would be necessary;  this makes it more worthwhile to train
apprentices, who will then provide exactly those specific skills which are
essential (Neubäumer, 1993, Berufsbildungsbericht 1992; Schöngen and West-
hoff 1992).   This is supported by the higher retention rate of apprentices in
large companies.   In addition, training costs are tax deductible; with the higher
tax rate of larger companies, the after tax cost of training apprentices is further
reduced.
3.   Cost Increases in the 1990s
3.1.  Weekly working time reduction
For many years West Germany has had one of the lowest number of yearly
working hours per worker of any industrialized country.   In addition to about six
weeks of vacations plus public holidays plus paid sick days, the average
working hours per week are decreasing.  This trend is well illustrated in the
metal industry.  At the beginning of 1980 the standard working time was 40
hours;  a progressive decrease took place until a 35 hour week was agreed on
in October, 1995.   While this decrease of 14% in working time affects workers
and trainees in the same way, the time for productive work of the apprentice
was squeezed.   Given that the trainee needs instruction for the same amount
of time as before - or even more because of more demanding training
requirements (discussed below) - the reduced working time has led to a more
than proportional cut in apprentices’ productive work:  fewer total hours,
combined with the same time spent on theoretical training, leaves less time for
work in production.   A hypothetical example will clarify the impact of this
change:  given a decrease in working time from 38 to 35 hours per week, and
10
assuming that theoretical instruction at school and work take up 18 hours, the
decrease in time for an apprentice’s productive contribution is 15%, falling from
20 to 17 hours.
3.2.  Broader training requirements
The German apprenticeship system is subject to continuous modification.   One
distinct sign of change is the reduction in the number of occupations from 901
in 1950, to 606 in 1970, to 374 in 1995.   The consolidation of older courses is
even greater when we consider that new occupations have also been added
over time.   Since 1969 the skill requirements in all occupations have been
modernized and intensified in scope and in depth.   In 1995 the Federal
Vocational Training Institute was working on updating 90 occupations
(Berufsbildungsbericht 1995).   In the occupations of the metal and electrical
industries, for example, not only an updating but a structural reform has taken
place.   Since the new standards were set in 1987, apprentices in all the metal
occupations undertake a common course for the first one and a half years.
Only then does a gradual specialization take place.   In contrast to the past,
companies must be equipped to train during these years not only for their own
specialist occupation, but also in a much broader area.   This leads to a
reduction in productive time in two ways.   First, the more general training takes
longer and involves less hands-on production.  Second, demands for deeper
technical know-how have increased, which require more teaching time for  new
computer technologies, team work, communication competencies, and complex
work processes.   Continuing our example from the previous section, the
requirement of only one more training hour reduces the time for productive
contributions by a further 6% (i.e., bringing productive time down from 17 to 16
hours).
3. 3.  Increased time for vocational schooling
These increased requirements consequently demand a better theoretical
preparation and understanding, which leads to longer vocational schooling.
Table 4 shows the sizeable decrease in the proportion of trainees in West
Germany who attended fewer than 8 lessons per week; the figure fell from 30%
to 11% between 1980 to 1990, and it dropped a further 5% in 1994.  The
effects of this reduction are first, that the increased time spent on theoretical
training reduces the time available for practical work and therefore increases
the net training costs to the company.   Second, any schooling above 8 hours
per week generally requires that the trainee attend school for a second day.
Since the schooling is occupation-specific and therefore often not available in
smaller cities, many trainees have long travel times.   The journey time back to
the company on that day further reduces the hours devoted to productive work.
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A solution to this problem could be the more widespread use of block release,2
which has in fact been increasing in recent years, or a different organization of
the schooling time.
Table 4:   Increase in weekly lessons at vocational schools in West Germany *
1980 1990 1994
less than 8 lessons 30.8 11.3   5.5
8 to 10 38.1 41.3 30.7
11 and more 14.3 29.8 31.4
block release 17.6 17.6 20.9
*missing percentages could not be placed in a category
source:   Grund- und Strukturdaten 1995/96
3. 4.  Higher training wages
While the above factors indirectly increase training cost by reducing the time
available for productive output, the highest cost factor in the variable costs have
historically been apprentice wages.  The pay differs among occupations,
training years, and regions.  The highest wages are paid in the public service
and in industry and trade:  more than 1,140 DM/month on average in 1996 in
West Germany.   At the low end are craft occupations - such as tailors, who
received less than 340 DM per month, and hairdressers , who got 680 DM per
month (Berufsbildungsbericht 1997).  The average remuneration across all
occupations was 1055 DM.  For the first year the rate is about a third of a
skilled worker’s wage, and then it increases by about 13-15% each year on
average.3   This relatively low remuneration is seen as representing an
investment by the trainee in his or her career.
Between 1991 and 1995 the average wages for skilled employees
increased by 16% in the industry and trade sector and by 14% in the craft
sector, while the corresponding increase for apprentices was much higher at
20% and 31% respectively (von Bardeleben et al. 1997).   Explanations for this
increase may be found in a) the general tendency to increase the pay of low
earning classes more than the higher ones, and b) the relatively high demand
for apprentices between 1990 and 1992, when more than 100,000
apprenticeship places were unfilled each year in West Germany (see below,
Table 8).   Since wage costs account for 80% of the total net variable costs of
apprenticeship training, the increase in net costs is almost the same as the
                                                          
2
 Block release denotes the system in which, rather than going to school one or two days per
week, apprentices spend a period of one to several weeks in school, followed by a period of
several weeks at the company.
3
 In East Germany the yearly increases are slightly higher (Berufsbildungsbericht 1997).
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increase in wages.   The variable net costs increased in the industry and trade
sector by 20% between 1991 and 1995; however, in the craft sector they have
gone up by 400% from the very low level of 1991 (von Bardeleben et al. 1997).
The substantial increase in costs has had a significant, detrimental impact on
the willingness of companies to train.   Employers surveyed claim that a
reduction or stagnation of wages and a longer period of time spent in the
company (e.g., 40 hour week for apprentices, holidays according to legal
minimum, better organization of vocational schooling) will lead to an increased
provision of training places.   They point to high training costs and short working
times as the most important of ten obstacles to increase training
(Berufsbildungsbericht 1997).
In conclusion, we can see that until 1991 the variable net costs of
apprenticeship training were relatively low for all types of companies.   Since
then, however, considerable cost increases have taken place.  Germany
experienced  a short boom following unification while other countries like the
US and UK were restructuring , but since 1992, Germany’s economy has
lagged far behind its key competitors.   Most companies have undertaken
serious restructuring efforts, using costs as a dominant variable in decision-
making.  Increasing training costs therefore has a detrimental effect on the
willingness of companies to train.  Although the training wages for apprentices
are low in relation to German skilled workers’ wages, the average wage per
apprentice’s productive working hour - if we assume 16 hours of productive
working time per week and 69 hours per month - is 15.29 DM, which is higher
than the wage of skilled workers in many of Germany’s competitors.   A weekly
increase of just two hours in working time would reduce the hourly wage to
13.63 DM.   This calculation reflects the sensitivity of training costs to wages.
4.   The Problems of Unification and the Recession
4. 1.   Transfer of the Apprenticeship System to East Germany
The transfer of the apprenticeship system to East Germany was in many ways
easier than the transfer of other institutions, since a dual system of a certain
type had existed in the GDR.   In the GDR, about 65% of an age group - a
slightly lower figure than in West Germany - entered an apprenticeship after
completing general schooling in the 1980s.   In contrast to West Germany, the
apprenticeships lasted only two instead of three to three and a half years.
Apprenticeship was considered basic training, and so many former apprentices
later took part in further education courses.  As a result of the different industrial
structure of the GDR, the proportion of trainees in different sectors was
dissimilar between the two systems:  42% of apprentices were in industry and
12% were in agriculture in the GDR,  versus 22% and 1%  in West Germany.
As the craft sector was relatively small, and private companies were limited in
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numbers, larger industrial firms were the principal providers of apprenticeship
training.   The opportunity to take the Meister examination played an important
role in both systems.   In 1989, 17,500 skilled workers passed this exam in the
GDR and 55,500 in West Germany, which is roughly a similar proportion of the
labor force.
Since unification, an immense further training effort has been undertaken
to update the quality of vocational qualifications to the more modern technology
of the Western world and to the more demanding aspects of work, e.g., to
enable workers to accomplish a broad range of complex tasks without guidance
and to retrain those who have lost their jobs in the restructuring process
(Andresen 1992, Wagner 1993, Grünert, and Lutz 1995).   The institutions that
support training in western Germany -  such as the chambers, which supervise
apprenticeship training (Franz and Soskice 1995, Soskice 1994, Streeck et al.
1987) - had to be built up in the new federal states.   Trade unions and
employer associations moved to East Germany, and experts from the West
German chambers helped to set up the new system and trained the trainers.
To compensate for existing deficits in the training facilities, external training
centers were instituted in East Germany, at a cost of 450 million DM in 1991.
Despite great efforts, the number of apprenticeship places was not sufficient,
even in 1991, when the Treuhand kept many companies operating:  nine
thousand school-leavers had to be trained in external places that year.   In
1992-93, the state provided 11 billion DM for retraining and further training.
Large investments were made to bring vocational schools up-to-date.
With the transfer of institutions, adjustments to the West German working
environment are taking place in the new federal states.  Working time in East
Germany was 40 hours per week in 1990, but it is moving relatively quickly to
the West German standard.  In 1996 the 38 hour working week was introduced,
while at the same time the vacation period increased from 20 to 30 days.   The
average wage level of a trainee, like the general wage level, lagged behind
depending on the occupation.   Apprentices' wages ranged from 39% to 75% of
comparable wages in West Germany in 1991.  The majority did not reach 65%
of the West German level.   Thus, the starting wage of a tailor was just 140 DM,
of a banking clerk 500 DM, and of a metal worker 420 DM
(Berufsbildungsbericht 1992).   Only two years later, in 1993, wages had
reached 80% of the western wage level on average.   As the West German
wages grew strongly during this period the East German increase is even more
dramatic.
4. 2.   Supply and demand for apprenticeship places in
East and West Germany
The supply of apprenticeship places has historically closely followed demand in
recent history in West Germany.  An enormous increase in the number of
school-leavers at the beginning of the 1980s was absorbed by the dual system
(Althoff 1994).   Since then the number of school-leavers and apprentices has
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been declining (table 5).  Keeping this close relationship in mind, the fact that
the supply of apprenticeships has been sharply decreasing over the last ten
years is in itself no indication of a problem with the dual system.  On the
contrary, the elastic reaction of supply to demand is a very positive feature of
the system.   However, the relationship between unfilled demand and supply
has changed dramatically since 1990.   From 1990 to 1992, more than 110,000
training places could not be filled.  At that time every school-leaver who had not
found an apprenticeship place statistically had a choice among ten
apprenticeship openings; in 1996 there were only 1.4 such openings left.
Although this reflects a much more restricted choice, it is still higher than in
1975.
The socialist party has proposed a levy system paid as a proportion of the
wage costs to increase the number of apprenticeship openings.  It would be
implemented when, for each 100 persons looking for an apprenticeship, fewer
than 112.5 openings are available, and the average company training ratio
(number of apprentices/number of employees) would be less than 6%.  The
employers’ associations argue that this would increase administrative costs and
not necessarily lead to more apprenticeship places; as many employers might
prefer to pay the levy(as has been the experience with the levy for handicapped
employees).  In addition, if public officials decide to expand the supply of
apprenticeships in areas where there is no demand from employers, this will
likely produce a labor market mismatch when apprentices complete their
training and look for jobs.  For example, in 1995 60% of the male apprentices
wanted to train in just five occupations.   The openings in these 'dream'
occupations, however, offered enough places for less than half of them.  Sixty
percent of the female apprentices also wanted to enter just five occupations;
little more than half of them succeeded (Berufsbildungsbericht 1997).
Although not all apprentices can follow their wishes, the big advantage of a
voluntary provision of apprenticeships by employers is that it closely follows the
demand by the economy.
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Table 5: Supply and Demand for New Apprenticeships (in thousands)
year West Germany East Germany
supply
of
Training
Places
demand unfilled
supply*
unfilled
demand*
supply
of
Training
Places
demand unfilled
supply
unfilled
demand
1975
1980
1990
1992
1994
1996
480
695
659
623
503
483
486
667
559
512
468
473
18
45
114
123
53
34
24
17
14
12
18
25
99
119
126
96
119
139
3
1
1
1
2
13
source:   Grund- und Strukturdaten 1996/97, Berufsbildungsbericht 1997
*unfilled supply: open apprenticeship places;  unfilled demand: school-leavers still looking for an
apprenticeship place.
Table 6a shows the numerical development of apprenticeship places in
different sectors in West Germany.   The service sector exhibits steady growth,
reflecting the increase in the services’ share of the economy.   The
industry/trade and the craft sectors vary greatly, showing much flexibility in
reaction to changing demand.   Some authors have criticized the strong
increase in craft apprenticeships from 1970 to 1980, when the school-leavers
from the baby boom entered the labor market (Casey 1990, van Lieshout
1996).   They argue that mainly the "cheaper" - i.e., the craft apprenticeships -
were opened up, and that the industry/trade sector did not react.   However, the
interpretation depends very much on the base year that is chosen.   If we
consider the increase from 1975 to 1985, then the industry  and trade sector
exactly matches the 38% increase in the total number of apprentices, while the
increase in the craft sector was slightly lower with 36%.  Thus, the burden of the
increase from 1975 to 1985 was almost equally split between these two
sectors.   A similar development can be seen in the decrease from 1985 to
1994, where both sectors took 33% fewer apprentices.
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Table 6a:   Apprenticeships in Different Industry Sectors and New Contracts in
                    West Germany since 1970 (in thousands)
year total industry/ trade craft liberal occ. * new contracts
1970 1269 725 420 56
1975 1329 634 505 103 462
1980 1716 787 702 114 650
1985 1831 875 688 131 697
1990 1477 756 487 130 546
1995 1250 561 470 143 450
Grund- und Strukturdaten, different years
*doctors, dentists, accountants, lawyers, etc.
In East Germany the supply of apprenticeship places has been increasing
since 1991, but not as quickly as demand (Table 6b).  Demand increased
between 1992 and 1996 by 45%, but the supply of places increased by only a
quarter.  It has created a situation with a higher demand from young people for
training than supply, a case which occurred in West Germany only in the middle
of the 1970s (table 5).   This has led to the creation of considerable government
programs offering apprenticeship places, which have not been taken into
account in these figures.  While at the beginning these programs were mainly
undertaken in fictitious companies, in 1996 the majority of apprenticeships were
done in close cooperation with real companies.
Table 6b:   Apprenticeships in Different Industry Sectors and New Contracts in
                  East Germany since 1991 (in thousands)
year total industry/ trade craft liberal occ. new contracts
1991 235 145   67   6
1993 287 140 109 15 99
1995 329 142 146 17 123
source:  Grund- und Strukturdaten, 1996/97
A comparison of the different sectors in East Germany shows that only in
the industry/trade sector has a slight decrease in apprenticeships taken place.
Unlike in West Germany, where the increase in different sectors over time has
been stable, the underdevelopment of certain sectors of the economy in the
GDR accounts for the over-proportional expansion in apprenticeship places in
these sectors.  The craft sector and the service professions have increased
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more than twofold, reflecting their increased business activities, but the growth
in the demand for apprenticeship places was higher still.  According to an
employer survey, more training might be possible in the future:  about 1500
East German companies that currently do not train could be mobilized to offer
additional apprenticeships if they could get help to organize cooperative training
and be supported by external training centers (Berufsbildungsbericht 1996).
Two thirds of these places would be in the craft sector, 20% in services, 10% in
the liberal professions, and only 2% in industry.   In addition, companies that
already train would do more if additional financial support were available and
cooperative training partners could be found.   To overcome these difficulties,
the chambers have attempted to publicize  cooperative training and funding.
The difficult situation in the apprenticeship system has also led to an
increase in the drop-out rate.  In 1995, 25% of the new contracts in West
Germany and 21% in East Germany were dissolved, compared to just 16% in
1986 in West Germany.   The more restricted choice of apprenticeship places
might be one reason, as about 60% of the drop-outs happens in the first
training year (mostly during or before the probation period).  Half of these
dropouts find a new training place.  Another reason is the harsh economic
climate - about 8% of trainees in West Germany and 27% in the East had
formally to enter a new contract because of a change in the ownership of their
company (Berufsbildungsbericht 1997).
4. 3.   Increase in Unemployment
After a strong boost to the West German economy from unification in 1990-91,
recession hit Germany harder than in other industrialized countries.
Employment in manufacturing declined by more than 10% between 1991 and
1994, whereas the total decrease in the previous decade had amounted to less
than 3%.  Total unemployment rose during this time from 7% to 9%.   This
figure would be even greater if many firms had not tried to hold on to their
employees through the introduction of shorter hours) , in the hope that the
economy would pick up again after a short while.   Table 7a shows this rapid
increase in the number of short-term workers.
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Table 7a:   Employment in West Germany according to sectors, unemployment rate and short
term workers in mechanical engineering since 1991
year manufacturing trade/traffic* agriculture short-term workers** unemployment %
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
11,095,000
10,897,000
10,376,000
  9,969,000
5,628,000
5,713,000
5,665,000
5,587,000
957,000
909,000
856,000
815,000
    4,307
    5,593
  16,340
180,232
7.2
6.3
6.6
8.2
9.3
* and communication
** in mechanical engineering
Source:   Statistisches Bundesamt 1996
The contraction in East German manufacturing employment was far more
extreme, declining by 25% in just three years.  Short-term work was used
extensively to maintain working places after unification but then decreased
when it became clear that these places could not be kept (table 7b).  In
consequence, products and production were restructured and hidden
unemployment removed.  As there was no demand for many products in the
free market, and those firms with viable products were often very inefficient, the
transition from a planned economy was difficult, and many companies went
bankrupt.  Eastern German firms lacked managerial and technical
qualifications, sufficient equity capital, and the collateral necessary to secure
bank loans (as the ownership of buildings and sites were not clear for a long
time).  The ensuing crisis would have been much more severe if managerial
help and investments had not been transferred from West Germany (Wagner
1993, Hitchens, Wagner, and Birnie 1991).
Table 7b:   Employment in East Germany by sector, showing short term workers
                  and unemployment rate since 1991
year manufacturing trade, traffic* agriculture short-term workers** unemployment rate
(%)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
3,112,000
2,450,000
2,322,000
2,342,000
1,320,000
1,244,000
1,219,000
1,213,000
454,000
282,000
232,000
226,000
-
165,648
  64,075
  31,294
-
12.2
14.3
13.7
14.9
* and communication
** in mechanical engineering
source:   Statistisches Jahrbuch 1996
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The job losses in East Germany mainly affected workers in industry and
agriculture, where employment  has dropped by about two thirds since 1989.  It
will be very difficult to turn this development around, since many companies are
barely surviving, even with  wages that remain substantially below those in
West Germany (Mallok 1996).  The only increase in employment can be found
in the so-called ‘liberal professions,’ many of which were almost nonexistent in
the GDR.  These include lawyers, tax advisors, and insurance agents.   Even
the trade, traffic, and communications sectors have lost working places.
Unemployment rose to almost 15% by 1996, which does not include the high
number of people in early retirement, further training measures, and work
creation programs (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen).  If we add to the
unemployed those in work programs or further education, along with those who
are not registered as unemployed because they have become so discouraged
that they are not seeking work, the figure reaches 28%.  Adding those who
commute to West Germany for jobs and who are currently in early retirement
we can estimate that working places for about a third of the labor force are
missing in East Germany.   This does not even take into account those who
went into early retirement before 1996 (table 8).
Table 8:  Unemployment and people not in 'regular' employment in 1996
Labor Force 7,559,525 100%
unemployed People 1,097,572   14.5%
people in work programs   287,316     3.8%
people in further education   490,583     6.5%
people not registered as unemployed*   265,000     3.5%
sum                     28.3%
commuters from East to West   323,329     4.3%
early retirement**   160,000     2.1%
total                     34.7%
* Stille Reserve;
**at the beginning of 1993 almost 900,000 people went into early retirement.
Source: Bach et al.  1996
4. 4.  Reduction in training
The economic recession has had a big impact on the training system in both
parts of Germany.  First, the reduced employment means that fewer companies
remain to offer apprenticeship places.  Second, the continuing pressure to
reduce the workforce makes it hard for the surviving companies to justify the
intake of apprentices.  Apprentices do productive work that the present
workforce would like to keep for itself to secure its own employment, particularly
if many of them have to accept reduced hours; and the trainees might not be
retained after completion of their apprenticeships, and the related benefits for
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the firms could not then be included in the cost calculus.   Third, at a time when
firms are focusing on cost-cutting, the recent increases in training costs might
lead companies to defer offering apprenticeship places.   The impact might be
particularly serious in the Mittelstand companies, which do no detailed
cost/benefit calculations, but which are acutely sensitive to wage increases.
Fourth, the large number of skilled people out of work reduces the hiring costs
(see chapter by Culpepper).
In East Germany the situation is more severe, and each of the above
arguments has a correspondingly greater impact.  In addition to the above
mentioned effects on training, the apprentices in East Germany are competing
to a much larger extent with adults in further education programs, whose wages
are largely paid by the government for their first period of employment.
Further, not only is the relative supply of apprenticeship places lower than in
West Germany, but in contrast to the trend in West Germany,  the demand for
apprenticeship places from school-leavers is growing.
The adjustment of company training activities to the economic downturn
differs by firm size and by industry.  Overall, the apprenticeship training ratio in
West Germany decreased from 7% in 1990 to 5.5% in 1995.  Small plants have
been and remain the most active in training (Table 9), since they can keep net
variable training costs relatively low (see section 2).   Establishments with more
than 500 employees have the lowest training ratio, as these companies have
the highest training costs.  However, the effects of increased costs and the
recession are also felt in the small companies, which have reduced their
average training ratio by more than 20%.  Between 1994 and 1995 there was a
slight increase in the number of training companies (Table 9), which is almost
exclusively due to the small establishments.   For companies taking on an
apprentice for the first time, there is a subsidy of 5,000 DM per apprentice.  For
smaller companies the subsidy may significantly offset net costs and allow them
to break even.
Table 9: Apprentice training ratio (apprentices to employees) according to plant size
              in West Germany in 1990 and 1995
no.  of employees apprentice training ratio # of training companies
1990 1995 1994 1995
1-9 10.9 8.0 217,055 220,354
10-49 8.3 6.6 119,883 120,621
50-499 5.9 4.5   42,779   42,658
500 + 5.2 4.3     4,304     4,241
total 7.0 5.5 384,021 387,874
source: data provided by the BMBF (1997) based on the employment statistics of the
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit and calculations by the Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung.
Between 1990 and 1995 the proportion of enterprises providing
apprenticeships  dropped from 28% to 24% (Table 10).  Traditionally the metal-
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working, precision engineering, and leather, textile, and food industries have
been most engaged in training.  The strongest decline in percentage terms has
taken place in the leather, textile, and food industries, where many plants have
closed or transferred production to lower wage countries.
Table 10: Percentage of plants with apprentice training according to industry in West Germany
plants training as a proportion of all plants
industry 1990 1995
metal working 42.4 33.6
precision engineering, optics,
watches
39.0 34.7
leather, textile, food 45.1 32.6
trade 22.9 16.9
traffic, communication 11.6 10.3
banks, insurance 22.2 18.8
services 27.6 24.1
total 28.3 23.7
source: BMBF (1997) based on the Beschäftigtenstatistik der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit and
calculations by the Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung.
5.  Measures to Ease the Strain on the Apprenticeship System
In the last few years, the pressures on the apprenticeship market have shifted
from the demand-side (not enough young people seeking to fill apprentice
openings between 1990 and 1992) to the supply-side (not enough
apprenticeship places since 1993) . In earlier years, concerns were raised that
the apprenticeship system might not be attractive enough to entice a sufficient
number of adequately qualified school-leavers in the future.  With the rising
costs of training and the recession, this situation has changed dramatically.
The present high demand for apprenticeships by school-leavers indicates a
greater need to think about measures to keep the apprenticeship system
attractive to companies.  Policy-makers must deal with the problems of both
supply and demand.
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5. 1.  Increasing attractiveness of the dual system to companies
5. 1. 1.   Designing apprenticeship occupations for new markets
   and updating existing qualifications
The globalization of markets, the restructuring of employment in manufacturing,
and the increased importance of the service sector have a variety of impacts on
apprenticeship profiles.  The introduction of new technologies and work
organizations require integrated job structures for which job profiles have to be
adjusted or almost completely changed.  For example, in the metal-working
industries the new requirements include, in addition to deeper technical know-
how, the individual planning of work, interpersonal skills, diagnostic skills and
the correct response to problems and defects, planning of materials and tools,
quality assurance, responsibility for delivery on time, and cost management
(Geer 1994).  At the same time the restructuring across and within economic
sectors leads to a) a change in the demand for different occupations in each
sector - the economic restructuring in East Germany shows this strongly -  and
b) the need to develop apprenticeships in innovative business areas.  While the
restructuring among individual sectors is quantitatively managed by the
increase and decrease in the supply of apprenticeships by the companies, the
development of training profiles for new business segments has to be realized
by the cooperation of the social partners together with the government.   One
such area is multimedia, where microelectronics has changed the industry and
a considerable growth in employment is expected through at least the year
2010.  This demand was recognized by the employer association and the trade
union, and together with the Federal Institute of Vocational Training, five new
apprenticeship occupations with integrated job profiles were created for the
media market.   In 1997, 5,000 apprentices have already registered in these
new professions.  Similar trends are observable in the fields of information
technology, safety, leasing, environment, and fast food, where additional
openings of apprenticeship places could be achieved once the job profiles are
defined.   Since the German system is based on cooperation and consent by
employers, trade unions, and the government, the development of new job
profiles can be slowed when the different interests cannot agree on a common
set of skill requirements.   The required consent also makes it difficult to update
profiles quickly:  for the metal occupations, this process took more than ten
years.   However, the pace of revision has recently quickened.  In 1996, 26 new
occupations were issued and 50 others modernized.
5.1.2.   Cooperation among companies
Due to the increased breadth of training and the requirement for quality in
updated apprenticeships, not all companies can fulfill modernized training
requirements in the prescribed range.   Therefore, cooperation among
companies has developed to complement each other’s capabilities.   In some
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cases, larger companies with a wide range of activities and a modern training
workshop offer training courses to other companies for which they pay a fee.
The effect is twofold:  the large company can increase the utilization of its
training facilities and lower its unit costs, and at the same time the smaller
companies can offer apprenticeship places despite their more limited range of
work processes.
Another way of cooperating is when two companies that have differing
operations split the training of a single apprentice.   An apprentice spends a
certain time at one company for one area of training and then continues at
another company to learn a different skill set.   A familiar example is the Hotel-
fachmann (skilled hotel clerk), who has to be trained in the kitchen/restaurant
as well as in the reception/rooms area at a hotel.   Since many firms specialize
in either restaurants or accommodation, they divide the labor of the training
phases according to their specialties.   In an effort to convince more companies
to offer apprenticeship places, the government and the chambers have
increased support for companies to find a training partner during the past few
years.
5.1.3.   Training centers
Cooperative training arrangements are not easy to set up, particularly for the
large number of smaller companies, because the different elements of training
requirements have to be met.   Very often only a few elements are missing,
making it more worthwhile to offer a few matching courses rather than to look
for a company with which to enter a cooperative arrangement.  To enable these
companies to train, the state has supported the establishment of external
training centers, where specific courses are offered to fill the gaps in a
company’s training capacity.  The chambers, trade unions, and employers'
associations manage most of these centers, supplying training modules that the
companies cannot themselves provide.   In 1991, 77,000 of these training
places existed in West Germany.   In East Germany they were built up quickly
after unification to help stabilize the shaky training market:  the number of East
German apprentices in training centers increased from 25,000 to 32,000
between 1991 and 1994.
5.2.  Attractiveness of apprenticeship for school-leavers
5.2.1.  The apprenticeship exam - a milestone for
semi-skilled workers
The apprenticeship examination is accepted as an important career step in
Germany, and it carries with it a high reputation.   Therefore it is important that
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persons who are disabled or disadvantaged, or who have failed to enter
apprenticeship training directly after general school, have a chance to achieve
this level.  A number of measures exist to help disadvantaged individuals
become qualified, such as a vocational preparation (or foundation) year to
boost basic skills prior to entering an apprenticeship along with subsequent
tutoring during the apprenticeship (see above).   For those who have not
previously entered apprenticeships, opportunities exist to take the examination
at a later stage without attending vocational schooling.  To qualify to sit the
exam, semi-skilled workers must show evidence that they have experience for
at least twice as long as the training period lasts in the corresponding
apprenticeship training.   The number of people taking advantage of this
opportunity has been increasing over the last ten years:  in the industry and
trade occupations the number of people taking the exams externally increased
from 19,000 in 1984 to 28,000 in 1994, which amounts to 8% of the exam
participants (Berufsbildungsbericht 1997).   This increase reflects, on the one
hand, the permeability of the system; on the other hand, the demand for this
examination by outsiders shows its attractiveness as a milestone for lifelong
learning activities, particularly for an aging labor force (see chapter by Gatter).
5.2.2. From skilled worker to manager
The traditional career ladder for skilled craft workers is to take and pass a
Meister or technician examination after at least two years of experience.  The
further training for Meisters is usually done in evening classes, while for
technicians it is done in full-time courses (Prais and Wagner 1988).   Most of
the training comes at the expense of the participant, although in some cases
subsidies and grants from the state are available (e.g., the Meister-Bafög).
The number of occupations having the possibility of taking a Meister
examination has grown; since the 1970s, when the Meister exams were only
common in the craft area,  Meister exams have been developed for different
industrial areas.  A wide variety of other further education examinations exist in
other sectors (Finegold et al. 1996).   This career ladder is an important
incentive for better qualified young people to enter the dual system, as they can
move into supervisory or middle management positions without the need to
complete the demanding top educational track and without studying at
university.   In 1993 45,000 skilled workers passed the Meister exams in the
craft sector, 15,000 in the manufacturing sector, and another 45,000
corresponding levels in the clerical area.   These 105,000 further training
certifications can be compared to the 530,000 apprenticeship exams passed in
the same year, which suggests that about 20% of apprentices take this career
step.   As is the case for the apprenticeship examinations, the need for
modernization of the further education profiles has become clear.  Recently,
negotiations to give the chambers more flexibility in the creation of new or the
modernization of existing further training regulations were completed
successfully (CEDEFOP 1997).
Drexel (1995) has expressed skepticism as to whether the Meister position
will still be viable after the introduction of modern work processes, in which
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front-line workers take over many of the traditional responsibilities of the
Meister.   However, research based on in-firm studies has shown that an
increasing demand exists for more highly skilled individuals to perform a variety
of tasks, from quality control to group facilitator,, for which people with Meister
qualifications are sought (Finegold and Wagner in this volume, Mason 1997).
The curriculum for the Meister examination is adapted to new requirements so
that the progression route remains open and even more attractive.
It should be noted that passing the Meister exam is not identical with
having a Meister (supervisor) position.   Despite the high number of Meister
exams passed, only about one-third of the industrial Meister positions are
occupied by a person with a Meister examination.   Although a pass in a
Meister exam does not automatically qualify for promotion to a Meister position,
only one in seven of those who pass has a position below his/her qualification
(Steedman et al. 1991, Hecker et al. 1997).   Meisters might have moved to a
technical position of comparable status to manager without having people
reporting to them or opened their own business, which is encouraged by
German law - it allows only people with a Meister certificate to manage a craft
business.   A survey of newly qualified technicians and Meisters conducted by
the Federal Institute of Vocational Training has shown that skilled workers take
Meister or technician training courses in order to achieve a higher or better
position, to differentiate themselves from other skilled workers, and to reduce
the possibility of being laid off (Hecker 1997).  Only a few Meisters expect that
persons coming from the higher education route, such as graduate engineers,
would be competitors for their positions.
5.2.3. Equivalence of general and vocational training
Anxiety has been expressed that the most able school-leavers increasingly go
to university and that not enough people with a good school qualification remain
in the dual system.   Although a career structure exists for apprentices to the
Meister and the technician exams, there is no direct formal path of career
advancement beyond this point.   Entering university currently requires
individuals to pass courses in general education, but a new law is now being
implemented to allow for more flexibility between general and vocational
schooling.  In the future, people with the Meister or technician certificates may
enter university without any additional testing.   This change will potentially
attract those school-leavers who are undecided about their occupational choice
and who choose the Gymnasium track just to keep open the possibility of a
university education.   With the new regulations, they might enter an
apprenticeship to learn the practical aspects of an occupation first, and if they
do well, they can continue at an institute of higher education.   Given a
continuous increase in the qualification level of apprentices over the long-term
(with 15% of the apprentices now already having passed the university
entrance exam), the concerns expressed above might be overly alarmist.
Moreover, statistical analysis shows that the vast majority of the changes in
demand for apprenticeships observed between 1980 and 1996 were due to
demographic changes, reduced supply of apprenticeships, and structural
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changes in the economy; these variables explain 97% of the variation, leaving
only 3% unexplained (Behringer and Ulrich 1997).
However, in comparative terms the German system still lacks flexibility
between work and education for the adult work force.   In the U.S., for example,
it is quite common that people leave work and to go back to college, full or part
time, which is still rare in Germany.  Given the growth in knowledge work, which
requires lifelong learning on and off the job, a greater flexibility of the schooling,
university, and dual system is a precondition for remaining competitive in a
changing world.
5.3.  Creating more training places
Shortly after unification the German government promised that each school-
leaver in East Germany would get an apprenticeship.   To fulfill this promise, a
program was begun that gave small enterprises 5,000 DM for each additional
apprentice they hired (see above paragraph 4.4.).   Companies that took
trainees  laid off by bankrupt companies received a larger sum, 8,000 DM for
each apprentice.   However, the decreasing employment in East Germany
made it difficult to meet the increased demand for apprenticeship places with
even these generous subsidies.   Although by 1994 15,000 East German
apprentices were trained in West German companies, the number of training
places was still not equal to the demand for apprenticeships.   In 1994, 35,000
apprentices were full-time  trained in training centers financed by the
government, of which 14,000 were new places to accommodate every school-
leaver from that year who had not found a place in a firm.   Similar numbers
were taken in 1995 and 1996.   To maintain a strong incentive for school-
leavers to search for in-company training places, the wages in external training
places - which are funded under §40c Arbeitsförderungsgesetz (work promotion
act) - were restricted to 460 DM in the first, 483 DM in the second, and 507 DM
in the third training year in 1996 (BIBB 1997).
To motivate more companies to offer training places, more than 9,000
career advisers from the labor offices and the chambers have been sent to
companies to campaign for new apprenticeship places and training
cooperation.  They visited more than 110,000 companies throughout Germany
and were able to persuade firms to create 27,000 new training places.  A
program of 54 million DM was set up to support this kind of activity and to
finance up to 150 training place “developers” for the period between 1995 and
1998.
5. 4.  Reducing costs
As discussed previously, the costs of training and the reduced hours of
apprentices at their companies have been pointed to by employers as major
27
obstacles to increasing the supply of apprenticeships.  The greater time spent
in the classroom limits the apprentices from doing productive work, and hence
is a major driver in the increase in the net training costs of employers, to which
several policy responses have been developed.  First, the federal ministry has
proposed increasing the working time of apprentices at companies by reducing
schooling to only one day in the second and third years of apprenticeship,
hoping thereby to increase the willingness of companies to take on apprentices.
Two states - because the authority in educational matters lies with the states
(Länder) in Germany - have taken this proposition on board, and have
increased the number of school lessons per day from eight to nine .  This
restructuring of schooling leads to an increase in the presence of apprentices at
the company by twenty to thirty working days per year, which is quite large if it
is seen in relation to the productive time of the trainees (iwd 1997).
A second response to the problem of high costs has been a wage increase
of only 1.8% in 1996.   While this is a first step, any further increases in
apprentice wages must be watched carefully.   For many companies, wages are
the most obvious and usually the largest cost item.   A decrease in the
remuneration of apprentices in relation to skilled workers might increase the
willingness of companies to offer more training places.  The social partners
should therefore try to keep the rises in wages for apprentices lower than the
rises for the skilled workers.   Third, the chambers have also contributed to a
decrease in training costs by waiving or reducing their collection of examination
fees for additional training places (Berufsbildungsbericht 1997).   For the other
training places, the chambers have agreed not to raise the fees for the next few
years, although the fees cover just 50% of the costs incurred by the chambers.
Fourth, the training in large companies could be more work-oriented;
apprentices prefer to do 'real' work instead of producing training pieces which
are then thrown away.   The earlier involvement of apprentices in production
has decreased the gross training costs by ten to fifteen percent at companies
like Volkswagen.   They could also be involved in developing solutions for
particular problems on the shop-floor, using team approaches.   Companies
that have tried this technique cited as examples the improvement of the lighting
on the shop-floor or designing and producing new logo signs.   The benefits
from these 'exercises' more than match the training costs.
6.   Conclusions
In the last few years the pressures on the German  apprenticeship system have
grown.   Because of the high interdependence of social and economic factors it
is difficult to identify a single cause.   From the above analysis we have seen
that, until 1991, the costs of training were finely balanced with the benefits
accruing to the training firm during or shortly after apprenticeship.  Up to that
point, the supply of apprenticeship places consistently exceeded the number of
school-leavers seeking apprenticeships.   Since 1990, however, the wages of
apprentices have risen more rapidly than those of skilled workers.
Simultaneously, higher training requirements and shorter working times have
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reduced the time apprentices devote to productive work.  In response to the
increases in cost, the supply of apprenticeship places decreased much more
quickly than the demand for places.
Some small steps have already been undertaken to remedy the high costs
of training which, if continued, might bring the system slowly back into
equilibrium.   For a faster adjustment more rigorous measures would have to be
tackled.   Splitting one wage between two apprentices has been suggested as a
proposal to reduce costs and to entice more employers to offer
apprenticeships.   This suggestion - which implies halving the wage of
apprentices - is probably too radical to be politically palatable.   However, a
reduction of fringe benefits to the legal minimum and a reorganization of
schooling to become more effective might decrease net costs considerably.   If
this balance cannot be achieved, the poaching problem, which is familiar from
the Anglo-Saxon context, might come up in Germany as well, hindering early
investments in human capital.
In East Germany the economic situation is much more severe:  the loss in
working places there has been more drastic, the real unemployment rate is
extremely high, and the threat of future unemployment increases is very real, as
productivity is still very low and wage increases continue to outstrip productivity
gains.   Therefore it will be even more important to keep the wages of
apprentices relatively low so that companies can break even on training and
thus remain motivated to offer apprenticeship places.   Even then, a long period
of dynamic and persistent growth will be required before the East German
economy is healthy enough to offer a sufficient number of training places; a
continuing need for state support can be expected in order to place all
apprentices over the next few years.  In West Germany, an upswing of the
economy and a reduction in the costs of training by various methods might
result in a situation like that at the beginning of the 1990s, characterized by a
high supply of apprenticeship places and a low demand because of the
depressed West German birth rates.   In this situation an internal migration of
East German school-leavers to enter West German apprenticeships should be
encouraged.
To ensure sufficient demand for apprenticeship places in the future, it is
important that the training system remains attractive to school-leavers.   It has
to provide up-to-date skills that will lead to good jobs with a promising career.
The modernization of apprenticeships should closely follow leading
technologies and the development of new industries.   The contact between
schools and companies should also be improved to facilitate an efficient
training program.   The equalization of general and vocational training
certificates will widen career choices and attract more able school-leavers.
Additionally, it will improve the flexibility of the educational system and remove
a disadvantage in further education of the German system, which otherwise
would hinder the lifelong learning requirements of an aging workforce.
The restructuring of German companies in response to globalization - a
process sped up by the recession - has forced them to become leaner in their
work organization, with fewer hierarchical levels but with higher demands on
29
technical and communications skills placed on each employee along with the
ability to do team work.  The consequently higher complexity of work will lead to
a demand for better skilled personnel.   Broadly based apprenticeships seem to
be capable of providing this functional flexibility and are a good basis for
lifelong learning and relearning, such that the dual system remains an important
asset for the German economy.   The biggest danger to the sustainability of
apprenticeship, however, may lie in current and future company investment
strategies, with many companies concentrating future growth in production
facilities outside of Germany because of concerns about cost competitiveness.
Therefore, employment growth in new markets has to be promoted, for which
new occupation profiles have to be created rapidly.
Considering all these factors the German dual system is not in crisis, but it
must react flexibly to changing market conditions.   Over the past decades the
system has proven that it is able to adapt.   However, the strong recession in
West Germany combined with the collapse of the East German industrial
working places put a higher level of strain on the apprenticeship system than it
has experienced previously.   The favorable economic situation at the beginning
of the 1990s and the scarcity of demand for apprenticeship places have also
led to cost increases that the system cannot bear, and which need to be
reduced quickly.  All social partners have to strengthen their efforts to overcome
these difficulties and to adjust the system.  Most of the problems have been
acknowledged by the government in accepting the report on "the reform project
for vocational training - for more flexible structures and modern occupations" in
April 1997 (Schmidt 1997).   However, these insights have to be converted into
actions.
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